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WHERE ARE TERRORISTS TO BE TRIED: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS GRANTED
TO SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
Amos N. Guiora
INTRODUCTION

Post-9/11, much disagreement and uncertainty remains about one of
the seminal issues in counterterrorism: where to try terrorists. While
much discussed, this issue is not resolved. This Article will analyze the
issue from a comparative perspective by examining American, Israeli,
Russian, Indian, and Spanish approaches. Though the five nations' judicial and legal regimes differ, a comparative approach enables policymakers, academics, and the public to develop a more global perspective on
the issue and possibly to adopt other nations' models.
In the context of articulating the most appropriate forum for trying terrorists, the considerations and ramifications are numerous. The guiding
principle must be the obligation of a civil, democratic society to respect
and uphold the rule of law. The analysis will include a discussion of how
each of the nations define suspected terrorists, before what court of law
terrorists are brought, what alternatives are considered, and whether
fundamental protections are guaranteed.
A critical issue in determining the appropriate forum is the terrorist defendant's right to confront his accuser. In the American criminal and
constitutional law context, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant
the right to "be confronted with the witnesses against him."' Should that
right be granted to the terrorist defendant? Bringing terrorists to trial
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Forces, held senior command position in the Judge Advocate General's Corps including
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would potentially require the exposing of intelligence sources. This is a
major dilemma that will be addressed throughout this Article.
Additional issues that must be addressed include: (1) Will the defendant be entitled to choose counsel or will counsel be assigned? 2 (2) Will
the defendant be tried by jury or by a bench trial? (3) Will the trial be
conducted by an independent judiciary? 3 (4) Will the defendant be
granted the right to appeal? (5) To what court will the defendant appeal,
if granted that right?
The primary purpose of any judicial regime is twofold: provide the
community with an opportunity to punish the wrongdoer and enable the
defendant to have his day in court. The issue before us, and that which is
facing decision makers, is how to most effectively implement these two
goals in the counterterrorism context. In providing a workable framework for this discussion, it is suggested that the present conflict with terrorism be defined as "armed conflict short of war." By so framing the
conflict, it is suggested that while civil, democratic states are not engaged
in war as defined by international law, neither are they confronting the
common criminal as defined by the traditional criminal law paradigm.
One of the critical issues facing scholars, policymakers, and decision
makers today is what rights, privileges, and obligations are owed to a suspected terrorist who has been captured. It should be added that resolution has not been reached regarding what term of art applies to the detained individual. Justice O'Connor, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, addressed
the Bush administration's definition of enemy combatant:

2. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834-35 (Nov. 16, 2001)
(leaving the policy decision of whether counsel will be appointed or chosen to the Secretary of Defense).
3. The presidential order establishing the military commissions did not provide for
an independent judiciary, as the court was comprised of senior military officers. Id. at
57,834.

4.

The five commonly accepted punishment theories in the criminal law paradigm,

all of which are relevant to the counterterrorism paradigm are retribution, incapacitation,
deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing
System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987). See generally David Dolinko,
Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 (1992); Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959 (2000); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's
Moral Right to Punish: A FurtherExploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,
65 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1990).
5. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Though Hamdi is an American citizen challenging the
United States government's authority to classify him as an enemy combatant, id. at 509
(plurality opinion), the case is of seminal importance as the Supreme Court addresses
many of the issues discussed here. Unlike the hundreds of other detainees captured in
Afghanistan, Hamdi was not held in Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 510. Rather, once the government determined his American citizenship, he was transferred to the brig in South
Carolina. Id.
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The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has
the authority to detain citizens who qualify as enemy combatants.
There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the
Government has never provided any court with the full criteria
that it uses in classifying individuals as such. It has made clear,
however, that, for purposes of this case, the enemy combatant
that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was part
of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict
against the United States there.6
The commensurate questions are significant. What judicial process is
appropriate for terrorists? What are the limits of interrogation?7 What
are the limits of detention? 8 What standard of review are they to be
granted?9 For what crimes may they be tried? Resolution of these questions evades us until the primary issue is addressed: where are suspected
terrorists to be tried?
I. THE UNITED STATES
In November 2001, President Bush issued a presidential order establishing military commissions for the express purpose of trying individuals
suspected of involvement in terrorism.' ° Shortly after the presidential
order was issued, the United States Senate Armed Services and Judiciary
Committees held a series of hearings." Administration witnesses justified
the establishment of the military commission by arguing that to effectively fight terrorism, an alternate judicial regime was required. 2 Ac-

6. Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief for the Respondents
at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696)).
7. See Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation and Torture, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427,427-28 (2006).
8. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion) ("It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.").
9. See id. at 533 ("[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.").
10. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
11. See To Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense's Implementation of the
President'sMilitary Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial by Military Commission of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War on Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed
Services, 107th Cong. (2001); Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms
While Defending Against Terrorism:Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Judiciary Hearings].
12. E.g., Judiciary Hearings,supra note 11, at 11, 17, 22 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
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cording to the Bush administration, Article III courts were inappropriate
for trying terrorists and those who provided them safe harbor. 3
When establishing the military tribunals, the administration relied on
the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Quirin.'4 The Court used three
different terms (unlawful combatant, enemy belligerent, and enemy combatant) in referring to captured German saboteurs.' 5 Though the Court
upheld President Roosevelt's decision to bring the German saboteurs
before a military tribunal, 16 the Court did not resolve the larger, far more
crucial issue of defining the saboteurs. The Court stated that "[w]e have
no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries
of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law
of war.' 7 In attempting to determine the Court's "working definition"
for any one of those interchangeably used terms, the assumption is that
the Court was referring to an individual, engaged in combat with the
United States, who for whatever reason was not a soldier.
The appellants in Quirin were German soldiers who lost their status as
soldiers when they purposefully discarded their uniforms. 18 Unlike terrorists, who do not belong to a regular army, the 1942 Court seemingly
applied this "working definition" to individuals who, by all accounts, had
been soldiers. 9 The loss of their status, resulting from their own actions,
enabled the Court to correctly determine that they were not acting as
soldiers at the time of their capture and thus not entitled to prisoner of
war status.
In relying on Quirin, the administration established a unique judicial
regime for the express purpose of trying detainees. The judicial regime
created by the Bush administration was premised on two foundations: (1)
that the detainees were not prisoners of war and therefore could be
brought to trial; and (2) that the detainees were not entitled to traditional
Article III protections afforded to defendants in the criminal law paradigm.
According to administration officials who testified before the Congress,20 the fundamental purpose of the presidential order was to bring
"justice to persons charged with offenses under the laws of armed con13. See id. at 60-62 (statement of William P. Barr, Former Att'y Gen. of the United
States).
14. See id. at 323 (testimony of Hon. John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States);
see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
15. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30-31.

16.

Cf. Louis FISHER,

NAZI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL

137-38 (2003).

17. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
1& Id. at 21, 38.
19. See id. at 37-38, 46; cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
20. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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flict '" and to "target a narrow class of individuals-terrorists. 2 1 In response to widespread criticism that the order insufficiently guaranteed
detainee's rightsY the Department of Defense issued ten instructions
intended to facilitate the order's implementation. The ten instructions
addressed a wide variety of issues:
Instruction1: Military Commission Instructions
Instruction2: Crimes and Elements for Trial by Military Commission
Instruction 3: Responsibilities of the Chief Prosecutor, Prosecutors, and Assistant Prosecutors
Instruction 4: Responsibilities of the Chief Defense Counsel, Detailed Defense Counsel, and Civilian Defense Counsel
Instruction5: Qualification of Civilian Defense Counsel
Instruction 6: Reporting Relationships for Military Commission
Personnel
Instruction 7: Sentencing
Instruction8: Administrative Procedures
Instruction 9: Review of Military Commission Proceedings
Instruction 10: Certain Evidentiary Determinations24
Criticism, which was fast in coming, centered on the following issues: the
lack of an independent judiciary, the lack of an appeals process, the lack
of a sentencing regime known to the detainee, the process by which counsel is assigned, the broad rules of evidence, and the ability of the prosecutor to submit classified evidence to the court that the defendant would
not be entitled to review.2
Determining the appropriate forum for trying suspected terrorists requires addressing two related questions: what is the correct or appropriate term to be used for those engaged in terrorism, and what rights are
they to be granted.
Have the attacks of September 11 resulted in a shift from
metaphorical war/actual crime control to actual armed conflict?
The suggestion that international terrorists pose a criminal threat
is met with impatience in some quarters, as if it somehow diminishes the magnitude of the events of September 11. Terrorist
21. Judiciary Hearings,supra note 11, at 14 (statement of Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
22. Id. at 316 (statement of Hon. John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
23. See id. at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary); William Safire, Op-Ed., Kangaroo Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at A17;
Robin Toner, Civil Liberty vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,

2001, at Al.
24. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions: Military Commission Instructions,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissionsinstructions.htm (last visited Feb.
22,2007) (emphasis added).
25. See sources cited supra note 23.

810
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crimes arguably differ from other transnational crimes, in that
they are politically motivated and pose a threat to national security. However, in democratic societies, crimes against national
security -espionage,

for example-are not generally handled by

military commissions. The Military Order of November 13 appears to rest on a perception that the current terrorist emergency
is legally of a warlike character, and not simply a danger to national security or suitable grounds for military involvement in law
enforcement. 26
The criminal law process guarantees the accused, and subsequently the
defendant, the following protections: (1) a presumption of innocence
until proven guilty;27 (2) the submission of evidence to an open court of
law;2 (3) the right to confront witnesses; 29 (4) the right to remain silent; 0

(5) the right to appeal to an independent judiciary;" and (6) the right to
trial by a jury of peers. 2 Perhaps the fundamental right granted by the
criminal law process is the defendant's right to confront his accusers,
thereby enabling cross-examination in open court. However, as counterterrorism is based on intelligence information, the prosecution would be
obligated to make intelligence sources available for cross-examination.
As has been documented, the risk is extraordinarily significant-if not
life-threatening-for sources who testify. 34
Adopting a paradigm that does not guarantee the defendant the right
to confront witnesses enables the prosecution to base a case, either in
whole or in part, on intelligence information. As an example -albeit one
that was criticized by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld35 -the
United States attempted to introduce intelligence information via the
"Mobbs declaration." 36 Justice O'Connor noted:
26. Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdictionof Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism,96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 346-47 (2002).
27. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. Id.
30. U.S. Const. amend. V.
31. Cf U.S. CONST.art. III (creating an independent judiciary).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Guiora & Page, supra note 7, at 428. Intelligence gathering largely emanates from
two sources: HUMINT, which is human intelligence; and SIGINT, which is signal intelligence. Id. HUMINT depends on individuals willing to act as sources for a variety of reasons. Id.
34. See The Secret Evidence Repeal Act: Hearing on H.R. 2121 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Thomas C. Homburger, Vice Chair,
Anti-Defamation League National Commission), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
congress/2000/homburger.html.
35. 542 U.S. 507, 532-35 (2004) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 512. The Mobbs declaration was a statement supplied by a Department of
Defense official, summarizing the intelligence information known to the authorities re-
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On remand, the Government filed a response and a motion to
dismiss the petition. It attached to its response a declaration
from one Michael Mobbs ...who identified himself as Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mobbs
indicated that in this position, he has been "substantially involved
with matters related to the detention of enemy combatants in the
current war against the al Qaeda terrorists and those who support
and harbor them (including the Taliban)." He expressed his
"familiar[ity]" with Department of Defense and United States
military policies and procedures applicable to the detention, control, and transfer of al Qaeda and Taliban personnel, and declared that "[b]ased upon my review of relevant records and reports, I am also familiar with the facts and circumstances related
to the capture of ...Hamdi and his detention by U. S. military
forces."
Justice O'Connor continued:
Mobbs then set forth what remains the sole evidentiary support that the Government has provided to the courts for Hamdi's
detention. The declaration states that Hamdi "traveled to Afghanistan" in July or August 2001, and that he thereafter "affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training."
It asserts that Hamdi "remained with his Taliban unit following
the attacks of September 11" and that, during the time when
Northern Alliance forces were "engaged in battle with the Taliban," "Hamdi's Taliban unit surrendered" to those forces, after
which he "surrender[ed] his Kalishnikov assault rifle" to them.
The Mobbs Declaration also states that, because al Qaeda and
the Taliban "were and are hostile forces engaged in armed conflict with the armed forces of the United States," "individuals associated with" those groups "were and continue to be enemy
combatants." Mobbs states that Hamdi was labeled an enemy
combatant "[b]ased upon his interviews and in light of his association with the Taliban." According to the declaration, a series
of "U.S. military screening team[s]" determined that Hamdi met
"the criteria for enemy combatants," and "[a] subsequent interview of Hamdi has confirmed the fact that he surrendered and

garding the activities of a particular defendant. Id. at 512-13. The material was used in
court proceedings. Id. In Israel, the classified information presented to the judge regarding a defendant was previously referred to as "negative security material" and reflected the
known intelligence based on HUMINT and SIGINT alike. The material was used for a
variety of criminal law and administrative sanctions. The primary issue is the reliability of
the source(s) and whether the material is corroborated. See Amos Guiora, Targeted Killings as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2004).
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gave his firearm to Northern Alliance forces, which supports his
classification as an enemy combatant."37
In a series of memos, the Bush administration clearly articulated a position that those detained in the "war on terrorism" were not guaranteed
Geneva Convention rights.38 Though the memos were subsequently "corrected,"3 9 the administration's initial (and instinctive) response is instructive in analyzing how the administration initially defined the terrorists'
status. In arguing that the detainees were not subject to Geneva Convention protections, the administration determined that they were not soldiers.4° Thus, the administration found that the detainees were to be denied basic international law rights, with the exception of receiving food,
water, shelter, and basic medical care. What rights were they denied?
According to the administration, the detainees could be subject to tor41
42
43
ture and indefinite detention, and denied independent judicial review.
According to the Geneva Convention, captured soldiers must be returned to their home state upon the cessation of hostilities." Unlike war,
in which an agreement between the warring states ends the conflict, the
present situation has no universally agreed upon beginning point, and an
agreement culminating its conclusion is difficult to foresee. The lack of a
foreseeable, agreed upon end to the conflict directly affects the detainees'
present and future status. As those detained will not be released in the
foreseeable future, the question of their status directly impacts the rights
granted to them.
Unlike criminals, whose date of release is determined in their presence
by either a judge or jury, enemy combatants as defined by the Bush administration are to be held literally in a "black hole." Indefinite detention, then, is a linchpin in defining the rights-or more accurately lack of
rights-of an enemy combatant.
.

37. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
38. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
(Aug. 1, 2002), in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND
THE WAR ON TERROR 115, 116, 144-45 (2004) [hereinafter Bybee Memo]; see also Guiora
& Page, supra note 7, at 432, 437-38, 440.
39. See Memorandum from Jerald Phifer to Commander, Dep't of Def. Joint Task
Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2001), in DANNER, supra note 38, at 167, 167-68; Memorandum from
Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Gen. James T. Hill, Commander,
USSOUTHCOM (Jan. 15,2003), in DANNER, supra note 38, at 183, 183.
40. See Bybee Memo, supra note 38, at 142, 145-46, 148-49.
41. See Guiora & Page, supra note 7, at 437-38.
42. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 6, at 14.
43. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834-35 (Nov. 16,
2001).
44. Geneva Convention, supra note 19, art. 118.
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The PresidentialOrder
The November 2001 presidential order establishing military commissions in Guantanamo Bay45 does not properly define the term enemy
combatant.4' According to section 2 of the presidential order, the following individuals will be brought before the military commissions:
(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any
individual who is not a United States citizen with respect to
whom I determine from time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit,
acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor,
that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause,
injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this
order .... 47
According to the above, an enemy combatant may be defined as any
individual, who in any way, shape, or form came in contact with any
member of al-Qaeda during any period of time with the intent of causing
harm, in the broadest definition of harm, to the United States. Enemy
combatant, as defined in the presidential order, is an individual who need
not necessarily have been involved in an act of terrorism in the present;
according to the above definition, it is sufficient to have provided assistance, even if minimal. Furthermore, the minimal degree required is not
defined, thereby leaving significant grounds for liberal interpretation on
the part of the executive in determining whether an individual is an enemy combatant.
When the Bush administration established the military commissions,
the intention was to provide a forum to detain, interrogate, and try "enemy combatants" pursuant to the presidential order.48 Since 2001, more
than 660 individuals captured in Afghanistan were transferred to Guantanamo Bay.49 These individuals, accused of being enemy combatants,

45. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833-34.
46. In fact, the military order of Nov. 13, 2001 does not even use the term "enemy
combatant" at all. Rather, it describes in general terms "'individual[s] subject to this order."' Id. at 57,834.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 57,833.
49. Guantanamo Bay Detainees, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/
guantanamo-baydetainees.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (reporting that this is the high-

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 56:805

were considered by the United States government to be the "enemy."
The numbers speak for themselves: of the 598 individuals initially detained,0 267 have been released."
Justice O'Connor's troubling words in Hamdi that "the Constitution
would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's
evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair
opportunity for rebuttal were provided,"52 reflect a perspective that may
suggest a "slippery slope" regarding rights denied to the defendants in
military commission hearings. A critical issue in the detention of enemy
combatants is determining the threat they pose to the nation's security.
One of the disturbing conclusions emanating from Guantanamo Bay is
that some individuals were detained without cause. Furthermore, individuals were transported to Guantanamo though neither intelligence nor
evidence was available regarding their involvement in terrorism, as required by the presidential order.53
The criminal law paradigm as analyzed in a wide range of U.S. Supreme Court cases,-' addresses the question of when an individual may be
detained. What must be established is when an individual can be designated an enemy combatant, detained, and potentially remanded. Justice
Stevens' dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla addresses this issue:
Whether respondent is entitled to immediate release is a question that reasonable jurists may answer in different ways. There
is, however, only one possible answer to the question whether he
is entitled to a hearing on the justification for his detention.
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free
society. Even more important than the method of selecting the
people's rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of law. Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of investigating and
preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber. Access to counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen

est number of detainees held at one time at Guantanamo Bay, but the numbers fluctuate
as more people are detained and some detainees are released).
50. Id. (stating that this is the number of original detainees from August 5, 2002, but
since then, there have been additional transfers to Guantanamo Bay, and by November 24,
2003, the number of detainees was approximately 660, with the number declining since
then).
51. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Release Announced (Feb. 9, 2006),
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2006/nr20060209-12461.html.
52. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,534 (2004).
53. See Carol D. Leonnig, Panel Ignored Evidence on Detainee, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
2005, at Al.
54. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 33, 39-41 (1942).
55. 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due
process.
Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of
enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes
be justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information.
Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure.
Whether the information so procured is more or less reliable than
that acquired by more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist
an assault by the forces of tyranny.56
Accordingly, the need to develop standards in determining when and
why an individual may be detained is ultimately more significant than
how. It places a heavy burden on the state for a nation to determine that
an individual is an enemy combatant and therefore deprived of rights
fundamental to the criminal law process. In such cases, the state must
have either intelligence information57 or criminal evidence strongly indicating that the individual is actively engaged in an organization either
known to be a terrorist organization or suspected of being one.
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the issue of the military
commissions and enemy combatants in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld18 The
Court stated that under the commission's procedures:
The accused and his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and
precluded from ever learning what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding that ... the presiding officer decides to "close." Grounds for closure "include the protection of
information classified or classifiable . .. ; the physical safety of
participants ... including prospective witnesses; [the protection
of] intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national security interests." Appointed military
defense counsel must be privy to these closed sessions, but may,
at the presiding officer's discretion, be forbidden to reveal to his
or her client what took place therein.
Another striking feature of the rules governing Hamdan's
commission is that they permit the admission of any evidence
that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, "would have probative value to a reasonable person."... Moreover, the accused and
his civilian counsel may be denied access to evidence in the form
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 464-65.
For a discussion of intelligence information, see Guiora, supra note 36, at 322.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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of "protected information" (which includes classified information
as well as "information protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure" and "information concerning other national security interests"), so long as the presiding officer concludes that
the evidence is "probative"... and that its admission without the
accused's knowledge would not "result in the denial of a full and
fair trial."'5 9
In further analyzing the procedures for the military commissions, the
Court made clear that even if Hamdan were dangerous and posed a
threat of great harm or death to innocent civilians, the government still
must comply with the law.6'
"Actively engaged" is to be defined as follows: participating in the
planning of an attack, providing harbor to those committing the attack,
ensuring the availability of financial resources, providing significant logistical support, or actually performing the act. These four parts form the
essence of terrorism. In rejecting the government's argument regarding
Hamdi's right to challenge his detention, the Supreme Court stated:
We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge
his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of
the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to
rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. "For more than a century the central meaning of
procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are
to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified.' It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' These essential constitutional promises may not be
eroded.
At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may
demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that
presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for
rebuttal were provided.6'
59. Id. at 2786-87 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 2798.
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted).
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Five years after 9/11, the appropriate forum for trying suspected terrorists has not been clearly identified by the United States. If viewed as a
"journey," then the trail navigated by the Bush administration is murky.
From the initial decision to establish military commissions premised on
troubled case law, the path has been less than clear. In determining that
the suspected terrorists were not to enjoy Article III protections, the administration denied the detainees basic constitutional protections. Nevertheless, in at least one case, the administration decided to try a suspected terrorist in an Article III court.6 2 The proceedings in the Moussaoui trial-result notwithstanding--resembled a circus more than a
process. Whatever the cause, an unruly defendant or a timid court, begs
the issue. The manner in which the trial was conducted reflects enormous weaknesses in the traditional Article III judicial paradigm's ability
to try "untraditional" defendants. However, five years after the establishment of the military tribunals in Guantanamo Bay, not one individual
has been tried in the military commissions. The Bush administration's
initial efforts to establish a new judicial paradigm were met with significant criticism from all quarters.
This Article suggests that the failure to clearly, coherently, and consistently articulate a response as to where suspected terrorists are to be tried
is problematic from many perspectives-the legal, judicial, policy, and
practical. Rather than "define the issue," both the executive and judicial
branches (perhaps with congressional acquiescence) continued the tradition of failing to define the non-soldier combatant. As long as the status
of suspected terrorists is not defined, it is all but impossible to establish a
judicial regime that meets constitutional muster. Hamdan represents but
the Court's initial foray into this matter; how the issues of articulating the
status and rights of detainees are resolved will determine the appropriate
forum for trying suspected terrorists. Ambiguity reflected by "fits and
starts" guarantees that these fundamental issues remain unresolved in the
United States despite the recently enacted Military Commissions Act."
If an analogy from the sports world were to be applied, it would be said
with a reasonable degree of confidence--albeit regretfully-that five
years post-9/11, the U.S. is 0-2 in determining the appropriate forum for
trying terrorists.
II. ISRAEL
Israel applies a two-track approach to Palestinians suspected of having
committed acts of terrorism. 64 Following the June 1967 Six-Day War, the
62. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2004).
63. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
64. The focus of this section will be Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, with two caveats. First, there are a number of outstanding legal questions
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Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established military courts in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip 6' for the purpose of trying Palestinians residing in either area' suspected of having committed acts of terrorism. Military
judges are appointed by military commanders who had command responsibility over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; military prosecutors are
similarly appointed. 67 Palestinians are represented before the courts by
civilian defense attorneys-Palestinians and Israelis alike.
Palestinians brought before the courts are interrogated initially by the
General Security Services (in Hebrew: Shabak) 68 and afterwards by the
Israel police. 69 The charge sheet, based either on the individual's confession or on the testimony of others, is submitted to the court by the military prosecutor. The case is heard by a panel consisting either of one or
three judges.70 The trial is conducted according to rules of criminal pro-

concerning the status of residents of the Gaza Strip post-disengagement. Second, Israeli
citizens suspected of having committed acts of terrorism will be brought before civil courts
only, and for policy reasons, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts. However, Israeli citizens may be placed in administrative detention (similar to residents of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip), though the procedure is different than that in place for
Palestinians. It should be noted that Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel alike have been
placed in administrative detention over the years. For purposes of clarity, Palestinians
residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be referred to as Palestinians.
65. As these lines are written, the court's name has not been changed following disengagement.
66. According to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the occupying power may establish courts to try residents of the occupied area for offenses committed against the public good or security; courts with jurisdiction over civil matters that were in existence prior to the occupation must be allowed to
continue. Geneva Convention, supra note 19, arts. 64-71.
67. As Israel has never annexed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the commander of
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the West Bank is, in essence, the head of the military
government in the West Bank and until disengagement, his counterpart in the Gaza Strip
was the officer in command of the Gaza Strip. This author's appointment to be a prosecutor in the West Bank military court was signed by then-Major General Ehud Barak (OCCentral Command); an appointment to serve as a military judge in the Gaza Strip military
court was signed by Major General Matan Vilnay (ret.).
68. A number of High Court of Justice opinions have been written regarding various
interrogation measures. The seminal opinion is HO 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture
in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
69. The Israeli police commander in the West Bank, while serving under the director
general of the Israeli police, is under the command of the IDF area commander with the
exception of disciplinary affairs.
70. The size of the panel is determined by the severity of the charge sheet. Regarding
the composition of the panels, until recently, the presiding judge was a lawyer serving in
the IDF JAG Corps, and in those cases where the panel was composed of three judges, the
two additional judges were reserve officers who were not lawyers. Recently, two significant changes have been made: (1) the judges (unlike the prosecutors) no longer serve in
the JAG, instead serving in the IDF Military Court Unit; (2) lawyers serving in the reserves have replaced non-lawyers as the two additional judges. The IDF School of Military
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cedure and evidence akin to those in Israeli civilian courts and would be
very familiar to American trial lawyers. If convicted, the defendant may
appeal to the Military Court of Appeals; the prosecution may appeal if
the court has acquitted the defendant. During the course of the interrogation, the Israeli police may deny the suspect the right to see an attorney
for up to thirty-one days]
The second track that has been implemented by Israel over the course
of the past thirty-eight years is administrative detention." Administrative
detentions, unlike the criminal process, are not punitive; rather, an individual is detained if available intelligence information indicates the individual is involved in the preparation of a future attack. 73 Administrative
detentions are implemented if the intelligence information gathered regarding an individual cannot be made public for fear that harm will come
to an informant.74 In such instances, a senior IDF Commander75 will sign
an administrative detention order upon receipt of a recommendation
from the General Security Services and a legal opinion from an IDF legal
advisor. The legal opinion will analyze the intelligence information and
attempt to gauge whether the High Court of Justice will deny a petition
should the detainee file one.
Administrative detentions are codified in Article 85 of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945.76 The maximum detention period is
for renewable six-month periods subject to judicial review;77 there is no
statutorily determined time period limiting the number of detentions.
Renewability requires a showing that the detainee continues to present a
viable security threat. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the basis
for extension of the initial detention order is the same intelligence infor-

Law (when this author was its commander) instituted a training program for these newly
appointed judges.
71. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004, at 1833
(J. Comm. Print 2005).
72. AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 2 & n.1 (1997),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE150031997english/$FileMDE1500397.pdf.
73. Administrative sanctions are deterrent driven rather than punitive determinant.
74. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 72, at 5.
75. Generally, the commander who signs the orders is a one-star general and the
commander of the IDF in the West Bank; in extreme cases, the commander of the IDF for
the Central Command (a two-star general) will sign. During a large-scale military operation, a regional commander (full colonel) will sign.
76. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, in PALESTINE GAZETTE, Sept. 27, 1945,
http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/PDF/der1945_01.pdf. When the IDF occupied the
West Bank, these regulations were in place as they had been introduced by the British in
the Mandate period (1917-1948). As international law does not allow the occupying power
to erase existing laws, the IDF "inherited" the regulations from the Jordanians who ruled
the West Bank from 1948-1967.
77. The process repeats itself in its entirety.
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mation that had served as the basis for the military commander's initial
decision.
Administrative
detention has been heavily criticized for a number of
78
reasons. Primarily, the criticism has concentrated on two critical issues:
the detainee's inherent inability to confront his accuser and the resultant
"fishing expedition" his lawyer is required to conduct. However, unlike
the military commission mechanism established by the presidential order,7 9 the military commander's decision regarding the administrative
detention of an individual is subject to independent judicial review by the
High Court of Justice.s°
A. Trials of Detainees
The trials can take place in either of two different venues: civilian
courts or IDF military courts. The IDF military courts are not courtsmartial, which only try soldiers.
An overwhelming majority of Palestinians accused of terrorism acts are
tried in the military courts, even if the act was committed in Israel proper
(the pre-1967 borders). 81 The primary reason for this is substantive: if the
act was planned in the West Bank, the participants reside in the West
Bank, and the cells' activities primarily occur in the West Bank, the military courts are deemed to have proper jurisdiction over the matter.
The judicial trial process is similar to the American criminal system.
The defendant is innocent until proven guilty; the State submits a charge
sheet and the defendant may admit guilt." Similar to large American
cities, approximately 90% of defendants plead out.8 3 The most notable
difference is the lack of a jury trial in the Israeli system. 84
Similar to the constitutionally guaranteed right to confront the accuser,
secret intelligence information cannot be submitted to the court for pur78. See, e.g., Orna Ben-Naftali & Sean S. Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action:
Lebanese Hostages in Israel,41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 185-86 (2000); Eitan Barak, With the
Cover of Darkness: Ten Year Game with Human Lives as "Bargaining Chips" and the
Supreme Court, 8 PLILIM 77,80-81 (1999) (Isr.).
79. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835-36 (Nov. 16,

2001).
80. HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002] IsrSC 57(2) 349;
HCJ 5784/03 Salama v. IDF Commander in Judea & Samaria (Aug. 11, 2003), availableat
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/03/840/057/aO5/03057840.aO5.pdf.
81. Cf. Lisa Hajjar, Cause Lawyering in Transnational Perspective: National Conflict
and Human Rights in Israel/Palestine, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 473, 480-81 (1997).
82.

LESLIE SEBBA, MENACHEM HOROVITZ & RUTH GEVA, ISRAEL: CRIMINAL

48-50 (2003), available at
http://www.heuni.fi/uploads/*6hs3o3ru64zn5.pdf.
83. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerationsin the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 523,536 & n.30 (2005).
84. SEBBA, HOROVITZ & GEVA, supra note 82, at 50-52.
JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
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pose of conviction. However, it can be the basis both for a suspect's initial detention and the extension of remand. In Israel, a suspect who has
been arrested must be brought before a judge within twenty-four hours.'
In the West Bank, "as amended in 1997, a Palestinian may be held for
eight days before seeing a judge."
B. Administrative Hearingsfor Detainees
Administrative sanctions include deportations, assigned residence, and
administrative detention. The process is initiated when the GSS receives
intelligence information from one or more informants regarding a particular individual. 87 If the GSS determines that the information cannot be
submitted to an open court of law, then a recommendation will be made
to the military commander that the individual be administratively detained. 88
Should the military commander sign the detention order, the individual
will be brought before a military judge. This is not a trial-neither the
detainee nor his attorney has the right to examine the information on
which the detention is based. During the course of the hearing, the judge
fulfills a double-role: judge and defense counsel. The detention order, if
approved by the judge, is then reviewed by a higher ranking judge. Petitions can then be filed against these decisions to the High Court of Justice.89
The detention for six months is indefinitely renewable; however, an extension order is subject to mandatory review by an independent judiciary.
That is, the detention may be unlimited (the longest one was for a number of years), but each time, the process is renewed in full.
In implementing the additional track-as problematic as it is-Israel
recognizes that terrorists, while they possess certain rights, cannot be
granted full criminal law rights in every instance. As previously discussed, granting all terrorists full rights would foreclose the State's right
to detain individuals when only classified information is available. The
need of the State to protect itself requires the development of mecha85. Id at 43.
86. Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, Going Toe to Toe: PresidentBarak's and Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Theories of JudicialActivism, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 51,
61 (2005). Israel has never annexed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which explains
why its government is a military government. Id. at 61 n.58. In addition, the laws of Israel
do not apply to the two areas. Id "The legislation of the areas is drafted by the officers of
the Judge Advocate General Corps and signed into being by the Commander of the Central Command or by the Commander of the Southern Command (both are Major Generals; the equivalent to two-star generals)." Id.
87. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 72, at 2.
88. See id. at 5.
89. I have sat in on these hearings and decisions of mine have been appealed to the
High Court of Justice.
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nisms whereby the State grants terrorists rights, though not the full panoply of criminal rights.
Application
On April 14, 2002, the Israel Defense Forces arrested Marwan
Barghouti in Ramallah. 9° Barghouti, who was the head of the Tanzim, 9'
90. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information on Marwan and Ahmed Barghouti
(Apr. 15, 2002), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2002/4 (follow "Information on Marwan and Ahmed Barghouti" hyperlink). The Tel Aviv district court described
Barghouti as follows:
The Defendant, who is a resident of Ramallah, is the head of the Terrorist Organizations in the Judea and Samaria area. He is their leader and was a central partner in
their decision making.
The Defendant was subordinate to Yasser Arafat, who is head of the Terrorist Organizations.
During the Relevant Period for the Indictment, the Terrorist Organizations engaged in intensive Acts of Terror against Israeli targets, in accordance with the policy
established by the leadership of the organizations.
The Defendant led, managed and operated Acts of Terror against Israeli targets by
conspiring with senior field operatives, who were responsible for the actual implementation of the Acts of Terror, according to the aforesaid established policy, which the
Defendant was engaged in implementing.
Senior and key terror activists with whom the Defendant conspired to commit the
Acts of Terror under his leadership were, among others: Nasser Aweis, Ahmed
Barghouti, Nasser Abu Hamid, Ra'ad Karmi, Muhaned Diria (Abu Halawa), Muhammad Musalah (Abu Satha), Mansour Shrim and Mahmoud Titi [the "Field Commanders"]. Ahmed Barghouti ... also served as the Defendant's right hand man and
his liaison in contacts with the other Field Commanders.
The field commanders committed the Acts of Terror by conspiring with the field
activists [terror activists] who were subordinated to them, were under their command
and operated according to their orders ....
Each time a decision was made by the leadership of the Terrorist Organizations to
halt the Acts of Terror due to various constraints, political and otherwise, the Defendant instructed the Field Commanders and their subordinated activists to halt the
Acts of Terror.
The end result of this pattern of activity was that during the Relevant Period for
the Indictment, since no explicit order was given by the Defendant to halt the Acts of
Terror, the Commanders and their subordinate Terror Activists continued to carry
out Acts of Terror in accordance with the policy of the leadership of the Terrorist Organizations throughout that entire period, as detailed above.
Within the conspiracy to commit Acts of Terror and with the intention of promoting this conspiracy, the Defendant and his subordinates carried out a series of actions
that caused, promoted and enabled the implementation of the Acts of Terror.
Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel vs. Marwan Barghouti-Ruling by Judge
Zvi Gurfinkel (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2002/12
(follow "State of Israel vs. Marwan Barghouti-Ruling by Judge Zvi Gurfinkel" hyperlink)
[hereinafter Gurfinkel Decision].
91. The "Tanzim" is defined as
an organizational framework through which the activity of the Fatah members was
implemented in the Judea and Samaria region and in Gaza. In the Relevant Period
for the Indictment, the organization has waged a violent and armed struggle while
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challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to try his case arguing five fundamental points:
1. The authority of the State of Israel to try Palestinians who attack Israelis was negated upon the signing of the Oslo Accords.
2. The rules of international law reject Israel's right to try the
Defendant, since he is a freedom fighter opposing occupation.
All forms of opposition have been defined as legitimate, including the use of violent force. If such a fighter is apprehended, he is
to be defined as a prisoner of war and not as a criminal.
3. The Defendant was kidnapped from Ramallah by IDF soldiers
contrary to the Oslo Accords and international law.
4. The Defendant holds immunity negating the right of the State
of Israel to put him on trial.
5. The agaist
indictment
is political
and constitutes an indictment
".
he
.92
against the entire Palestinian people.
Though Barghouti was a resident of the West Bank, a politically based
decision was made to bring him to trial in an Israeli civilian court rather
than in the West Bank military court.93 In the context of the two-track
approach implemented by Israel, Barghouti was to be tried before a court
of law rather than subjected to the administrative detention process. 94 In
determining which track to apply, the criminal law process is legally preferable as the defendant's basic rights are guaranteed though operational
and intelligence considerations may conceivably outweigh legal considerations.
In addressing Barghouti's status, the court (Judge Zvi
Gurfinkel) examined the international law issue:

committing Acts of Terror against Israel, its civilians and its soldiers. The Tanzim is a
terrorist organization as defined in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.
Gurfinkel Decision, supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians who commit acts of terrorism are
brought to trial in the Military Courts even if they committed or were responsible for others having committed acts of terror in Israel. The decision regarding Barghouti was based
on political considerations -it was assumed that there would be overwhelming media
interest in the trial given his preeminent position, his relationship with Arafat and that he
counted among his friends members of the Israeli left. In light of this expected media
interest it was felt that the civilian court system would be a more "appropriate" venue.
According both to various media reports and information to which this writer is privy,
there was opposition to this decision within the security apparatus as it was felt that military judges who had been sitting in terrorist cases for years would be more competent in
handling the issues Barghouti was expected to raise and that the process would be both
more efficient and more effective if the case were not brought to the civilian court.
94. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Marwan Bin Khatib Barghouti (Sept. 5, 2002),
http://www.mfa.gov.iUmfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2002/9 (follow "Marwan Bin Khatib
Barghouti" hyperlink).
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The Defendant claims that he is to be considered a prisoner of
war, and, accordingly, the Occupying Power is forbidden to
prosecute him under criminal law.
The Defendant is not to be considered a prisoner of war.
Terrorists who attack a civilian population do not fall within
the framework of "lawful combatants" entitled to the status of
"prisoners of war," since they do not meet the conditions, in accordance with international law, that a lawful combatant is required to meet. The heads of the Palestinian terror organizations, of whom the Defendant is one, systematically violate the
rules of war.
International law distinguishes between two groups of combatants who undertake hostile actions against the State of Israel.
The first group of elements that undertake hostile actions
against the State comprises persons who are part of regular armies that engage in combative actions against the State of Israel
in accordance with the rules of war.
Combatants who act within the framework of this group and
are apprehended receive the status of prisoners of war. Prisoners
of war are not prosecuted in accordance with criminal law for
their participation in combative actions, provided that they acted
in accordance with the rules of war. If, however, they acted contrary to the rules of war, they may be prosecuted on account of
war crimes. 95
The two-track Israeli model enables the State to determine which judicial regime is applicable to a particular defendant depending on the nature of the information available. If the information is evidence-based,
enabling cross-examination in open court of witnesses, then the defendant will be charged in a criminal trial. However, if the case is predicated
on intelligence information, then the individual will be administratively
detained. While administrative detentions deny the individual the right
to confront his accuser, independent judicial review guarantees both procedural and substantive oversight. In direct contrast to the presidential
order establishing the military commissions or the recently enacted Military Commissions Act, independent judicial review is institutionalized in
Israel. The two-tier process described above is predicated on a clear definition of the terrorists, their status and the rights to be granted them.
III. RUSSIA
In 2003, 561 acts of terrorism were registered in Russia, an increase of 55.8 percent compared to 2002, Rosbalt news agency
reported on 20 January, citing figures provided by Russian Inte95. Gurfinkel Decision, supra note 90.
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rior Ministry Yurii Demidov. Four hundred of the attacks that
took place in Russia in 2003 took place in the Southern Federal
District, including 386 in the Chechen Republic, Demidov said.
"This is due to the ongoing subversive and terrorist activity of rebel groups, who gave up the struggle for an independent Chechnya a long time ago," he claimed. "Now they are just carrying
out the plans of international terrorists. ' ' 6
In analyzing what paradigm Russia implements, it is important to address two important questions: how do the Russians define the conflict,
and how does the conflict impact public debate and legislation. While the
judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, On the
Constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees and the Resolutions of the
Federal Government Concerning the Situation in Chechnya, never expressly used the term "non-international armed conflict," 97 it did state
that Geneva Convention Additional Protocol II should have been applied by the parties. 98
According to a 2003 State Department report:
Russia passed several new antiterrorism laws, began implementing previously passed legislation, and facilitated effective interdiction of terrorist finance flows by becoming a full member of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In February, the Russian
Supreme Court issued an official Government list of 15 terrorist
organizations, the first of its kind in Russia and an important step
toward implementation of counterterrorism statutes. Following
the promulgation of the list, the 15 organizations were prohibited
from engaging in any financial activities.
Nevertheless, according to the Russian penal code, terrorists are considered criminals, subject to a specific category within the criminal justice
system.
The Russian Criminal Code categorizes the following offenses
as criminal: terrorism, hostage-taking, hijacking of an aircraft, sea
vessel, or train, organization of an illegal armed unit, attempts on
the life of a State or public figure, and attacks on person or agencies enjoying international protection.
96.

Roman Kupchinsky, Russia: The Losing Battle Against Terrorism and Insurgency,
LIBERTY, Sept. 16, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/reports/
corruptionwatch/2004/09/17-160904.asp.
97. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation: On the Constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees and the Resolutions of the Federal Government Concerning the Situation in Chechnya (July 31, 1995), http://ks.rfnet.ru/english/decision/
d310795e.htm.
98. Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Chechnya and the Laws of War (Oct. 1999),
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/chech-tuzmuk.html.
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO

99.

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, PAT-rERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31940.pdf.

2003, at 35 (2004),
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The Code provides that serious criminal offences are premeditated actions for which the maximum punishment does not
Particularly serious preexceed 10 years imprisonment.
meditated actions carry a maximum punishment of ten years' imprisonment or more. The Russian Criminal Code states that the
punishment for "terrorism" is imprisonment for a period of from
5 to 10 years, for a period of from 8 to 15 years in cases with aggravating circumstances and for a period of from 10 to 20 years in
cases with especially aggravating circumstances.
Russian legislation establishes increased liability for recruiting
and training of terrorists and the financing of terrorist activities
and organizations. Pursuant to the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, persons who recruit, train or finance terrorists may
be considered accessories to a criminal offence and prosecuted.
Inducing a person to conmit a terrorist offence (by recruiting the
person) constitutes incitement and the perpetrator is held liable
under the Criminal Code. If a person has facilitated the commission of a terrorist offence by means of advice, directions, [or] the
provision of information, that person may be considered an accomplice to the offence. The liability of such a person is stipulated in the relevant article of the special section of the Criminal
Code.'0°
After Beslan, the Russian Duma unsuccessfully attempted to change
the punishment system.1"' The proposed amendments would have allowed for punishments against the terrorist's relatives.'9 In fact, the only
changes made after Beslan were in June 2004, when the Federation
Council approved proposed amendments to the Criminal Code, establishing life imprisonment as the maximum sentence for terrorist acts3
A Chechen, Islan Mukaev, was sentenced in a Daghestan court to a
twenty-five-year prison term for allegedly participating in the execution
of six captured Russian soldiers.'" In May 2005, one of the participants in
the Beslan school massacre was prosecuted in Vladikavkaz, the North

100.

INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INST., NATIONAL LAWS AND MEASURES FOR

COUNTER-TERRORISM

AND

REGULATION

OF BIOLOGY:

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

1

(2003),
available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/institutes-centers/ihrlidownloads/
publications/Russia.pdf.
101. Andrei Soldatov & Irini Borogan, Terrorism Prevention in Russia: One Year After
Beslan (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.borrull.org/e/noticia.php?id=52615.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Daghestan Court Sentences Chechen Insurgent, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY, Sept. 19, 2005, http://www.rferI.org/featuresarticle/2005/09/428A771F-B158489A-ADE9-D9562F9F4C1B.html.
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Ossetian capital. 5 The defendant, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, was charged with
nine crimes, including terrorism, murder, and banditry.' 6 According to
press accounts, one of his two attorneys had only been practicing law for
two weeks prior to being appointed by the State.
The prosecutors sought the death sentence for Kulayev for the deaths
of 330 people.' 8 The judge ruled that Russia's moratorium on capital
punishment prevented the imposition of the death penalty, and instead
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.' 9 Kulayev rested his defense
on claims that Chechen militants, suspecting Kulayev's brother was working for Russian security forces, had abducted Kulayev and his brother,
forcing them to Beslan."0 Kulayev's defense was rejected and contradicted by witnesses."'
The Russian approach-in spite of a series of particularly violent terrorist attacks-has been to consistently categorize the terrorists as criminals rather than as "enemy combatants." Nevertheless, as documented
elsewhere, Russian forces have consistently not treated Chechen terrorists as criminals." Criminals are not subjected to state actions similar to
those faced by Chechen terrorists. Accordingly, the question of whether
Russia considers Chechens engaged in combat with Russian forces as
criminals, enemy combatants, or terrorists requires a multiple response.
Once caught, the Chechen fighter is brought to trial similar to a criminal trial."3 In those circumstances, the detainee is subject to the relevant
105. See Beslan Siege Suspect Trial Begins, BBC NEWS, May 17, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4553757.stm.
106. Id.
107. Douglas Birch, Admitted Militant Goes on Trial in Russian School Hostage Case,
BALT. SUN, May 18, 2005, at 10A.
108. Beslan Attacker: No Death Penalty, CNN.COM, May 26, 2006, http://edition.
cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/26/russia.beslan/index.html.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: RUSSIA (2006),
http://hrw.org/wr2k6/pdf/russia.pdf;

AMNESTY

INT'L,

REPORT

2006:

RUSSIAN

FEDERATION, http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/rus-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 22,
2007) [hereinafter Report 2006]; Russia Condemned for 'Disappearance'of Chechen, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, July 27, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/27/russia13864.htm
(estimating that 3,000 to 5,000 people have disappeared in Chechnya since 2000);
AMNESTY INT'L, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: BRIEFING-TORTURE, "DISAPPEARANCES"
AND ALLEGED UNFAIR TRIALS IN RUSSIA'S NORTH CAUCASUS 1 (2005),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/eur460392005English/$file/eur4603905.pdf;
AMNESTY
INT'L, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: VIOLATIONS CONTINUE, NO JUSTICE IN SIGHT 1 (2005),

http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdfleur460292005english/$file/eur4602905.pdf;

HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH, WORSE THAN A WAR: "DISAPPEARANCES" IN CHECHNYA-A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY (2005), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chechnya0305/chechnya
0305.pdf.
113. See Report 2006, supra note 112.
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sections of the Russian penal code.1 As described above, the criminal
law process includes a prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and the right
to confront the accuser.
However, unlike criminal defendants suspected of having committed a
serious crime, Chechen terrorists are subjected to human rights violations
in combat. This approach is reminiscent of the Israeli approachoperationally engaging terrorists in the zone of combat and bringing them
to justice in the criminal law paradigm or an alternative such as administrative detention. The Russian approach is also similar to the American
approach of engaging terrorism in the zone of combat, but dissimilar from
the American approach in that the captured terrorist is provided a full
criminal process.
IV. INDIA

India faces a myriad of threats, external and internal alike. In analyzing whether terrorists are to be considered criminals or enemy combatants it is incumbent to recall the three threats India faces: (1) external in
the form of Pakistan; (2) Kashmirian-based terrorism supported by Pakistan; and (3) Hindu-Muslim and Sikh-Muslim domestic-based tension
and violence, which has resulted in acts of terrorism against the state. In
spite of these multiple threats, India has consistently adopted the criminal
law paradigm rather than developing or implementing an enemy combatant paradigm. The long-simmering conflict with Pakistan will not be addressed.
On March 26, 2002, the Indian parliament passed the Prevention of
Terrorism Act (POTA); on September 17, 2004, it was announced that
the Act would be subsequently repealed.115 POTA, which replaced the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), articulated the
Indian approach regarding which paradigm is applicable to ter116
rorists.

The developments after the enactment of the POTA, including
the responses received by the POTA review committee show that
the POTA is worse then [sic] TADA. POTA provides for criminal liability for mere association or communication with suspected terrorists without the possession of criminal intent (Section 3(5) of the POTA). Section 4 of POTA is similar to Section
5 of TADA in laying out a legal presumption that if a person is
found in unauthorized possession of arms in a notified area,
114.

See, e.g., Beslan Attacker: No Death Penalty,supra note 108.

115. India: POTA Repeal a Step Forwardfor Human Rights: Government Should Dismiss All POTA Cases, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Sept. 22, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/

2004/09/22/india9370.htm [hereinafter POTA Repeal].
116. See id.
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he/she is automatically linked with terrorist activity. Section
48(2) provides for the option of pre-trial police detention for up
to 180 days. As under the TADA, where 98% of the cases never
reached the trial stage, this Section 48(2) could also be misused
by the police by keeping an accused for long periods of detention
without charge or trial. Special courts for trials are established
under POTA which are given the discretion to hold trials in nonpublic places, like prisons, and to withhold .. . trial records from
public scrutiny, thus preventing the independent monitoring of
special court sessions. Section 32 provides that confessions made
to police officers are to be admissible in trial, which has increased
17
the possibility of coercion and torture in securing confessions.
In addition, fault was found with POTA for discarding "the fundamental right of [the] accused to due process and [a] presumption of innocence. Persons arrested under POTA could be held for 30 days before
authorities had to produce them ina special court of law.' 118 POTA also
allowed for the admission of evidence that would otherwise not be allowed in a criminal trial." 9
Unlike Spain, which expanded the criminal law paradigm to include incommunicado detention,' 20 India has reverted to a traditional criminal
law approach in attempting to combat terrorism. Furthermore, the present Indian approach is dissimilar from the Israeli model-which enables
the State to bring individuals suspected of committing terrorist acts either
before a court of law and charging them in open court, or ordering the
administrative detention of an alleged terrorist. The Russian approach
perhaps most closely resembles the Indian approach-the terrorist is defined as a criminal, and once detained, is guaranteed full rights according
to the criminal law paradigm that is devoid of either a parallel administrative detention track (Israel) or an entirely alternative approach such as
the military commissions (United States).
This reversion to a traditional criminal law approach occurred in 2004:
India has decided to repeal a controversial piece of anti-terrorism
legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). The move,
while welcomed by those who believe the legislation is draconian
and were criticizing its misuse, has raised concern over how the
117. Sachin Mehta, Repeal of POTA-Justified, http://www.legalservicesindia.com
articles/pota.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007).
118. Kranti Kumara, Repeal of India's DraconianAnti-terrorism Law: Largely a Cosmetic Change, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Nov. 27, 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/
2004/nov2004/ind-n27.shtml.
119. See id.
120. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEI7ING AN EXAMPLE?
COUNTER-TERRORISM
MEASURES IN SPAIN 23 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/spainOl05/
spain0105.pdf. See also infra Part V.
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government now proposes to tackle the problem of terrorism in
the country. 1
POTA's repeal suggests that the Indian government responded to international criticism of what had been considered "draconian powers"
granted to the authorities. 22 Both TADA and POTA had been the recipients of significant criticism for human rights abuses committed by
Indian law enforcement officials.'3 These powers enabled the State to
implement measures that extended beyond the traditional criminal law
paradigm. The measures were reflective of a hybrid that included aspects
of the criminal law paradigm but incorporated "special measures" directly affecting the rights of the individual detainee. The hybrid paradigm, which was implemented by India for a short period of time has
been, in essence, replaced by the traditional criminal law paradigm.
Following POTA's repeal, terrorists in India are brought to trial before
regular criminal courts4 In determining that the traditional criminal law
process is the most appropriate for trying suspected terrorists, India has
adopted a paradigm akin to Russia's. This similarity will be even more
pronounced should the Indian security forces aggressively, operationally
engage suspected terrorists; while simultaneously applying the criminal
law paradigm to detained, suspected terrorists. If India were to take such
a twin-track approach, it would be more reflective of Russia's twin-track
operational engagement-criminal law process approach as compared to
Israel's twin-track judicial paradigm approach.
V. SPAIN
"Under Spanish law, terrorism is classified as a crime that can be
prosecuted there even if it is alleged to have been committed in another
country. ' '2 Baltasar Garzon, Spain's top anti-terrorism magistrate, also
contends that "he can go after al-Qaeda because the September 11 plot
was partly set up in Spain."' 26 Spain views terrorism as a criminal matter
whereby terrorists are to be tried in courts of law established in accordance with the Spanish penal code.'2 Discussing whether, in Spain, ter121.

Sudha Ramachandran, Filling India's Anti-terrorism Void, ASIA TIMES

ONLINE,

Sept. 23,2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsia[FI23Df03.html.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See POTA Repeal, supra note 115.
125. Chris Johnston, 9/11 Terror Suspects on Trial in Spain, TIMES ONLINE (London),
Apr. 22, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1580871,00.html.
126. Id.
127. See Cdndido Conde-Pumpido Tour6n, Remarks at the 10th International Judicial
Conference, Judicial Response to Terrorism: National Venues-The Spanish Model (May
23, 2002) (transcript available
at http://www.coe.intfM/E/Com/Files/MinisterialConferences/2002-judicial/PanellC%C3%AlndidoCondePumpidoTourC3%B3n.asp).
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rorists are to be categorized in a different paradigm than criminals, Professor Fernndez SAnchez of the University of Salamanca stated:
Crimes of terrorism are outlined in the second section of the
Spanish Penal Code, (Chapter V, Title XII, Book II). Title XII
explicitly refers to crimes against the "public order," [but] a clear
definition of this concept of "public order" is not included in the
Code itself. "Public order" is generally understood as the normal
working of public and private institutions, and thought to be
about maintaining the internal peace and free development of the
fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. In fact, "public order" consists of maintaining the conditions essential for social coexistence in a peaceful environment, while remaining within the
democratic framework established by the Spanish Constitution.
Articles [sic] 571 of the Penal Code defines the objective elements of the crimes of terrorism, including arson and destruction.
These actions appear separately in another part of the Penal
Code; they are considered as crimes of terrorism only when other
elements are present. Those additional elements are that the author of the crime must belong to, act in the name of, or collaborate with armed bands, organizations or groups whose goal is to
disturb the constitutional order or the public peace.
Art. 572 of the Spanish Penal Code penalizes any individual
who acts against the life, health or freedom of any person when
the author of the crime is linked with an armed or terrorist organization. This requirement is essential as well in the regulation
accompanying art. 574-a residue regulation that penalizes any
crime that is not described expressly in the Penal Code but which
has the same conditions and the same goals as the rest of the
crimes of terrorism.
It is important to realize that when speaking about belonging
to, acting in the name of, or collaborating with an armed or terrorist group it is understood that a direct relationship has to exist
between the author of the crime and the armed group or terrorist
organization. The Spanish Supreme Court recognizes an "armed
group" as an association concentrating on armed action from
which permanent links are born. Hierarchy and discipline are
important to armed groups, whose actions are usually numerous
and unpredictable [sic], and who attack with suitable instruments
of violence provided by their criminal organization.'
Similar to the other surveyed nations, the question is whether the existing criminal law paradigm is applicable to terrorism. In the aftermath of
128. Maria Teresa Fernndez Sinchez, World Law: Spain, JURIST, Feb. 15, 2001,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/spaincor3.htm.
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the train station bombings, the Spanish authorities have arrested, interrogated, and brought to trial a number of individuals involved in the attack. 29 One hundred and sixteen people were arrested in connection
with the Madrid train bombings' 3° and on February 15, 2007, the trial of
twenty-nine suspects began.' And although incommunicado detention is
at odds with the "commonly accepted" criminal law process, and Spanish
authorities can detain terrorism suspects incommunicado, the Spanish
approach nevertheless considers terrorists to be criminals. The two-track
approach, as implemented by Israel, has not been introduced in Spain,
but the curtailment of terrorists' rights has been codified. 2 Although
incommunicado detention indicates a modification of the criminal law
process as applied to terrorism suspects, an alternative paradigm has not
yet been developed.
Terrorism does not constitute a form of war in the strictest
sense, but rather a form of crime, whilst possessing specific characteristics which set it apart from ordinary crime. As political insurrections or coups d'etats, it is a threat to society: its intention is
to change the existing political situation through violence. It is
the terrorists who present their crimes as methods of war, whilst
directing their attacks against civilian victims. It is the role of
democratic governments, in their fight against terrorism, to decide whether they can accept this claim or whether they prefer to
treat terrorists as perpetrators of a specific kind of crime.
In Spain, the fight against terrorism is not undertaken in a bellicose way, but as a specific chapter in the fight against crime, independent of the political problems it poses and which cannot be
left to one side. This is why criminal law and the courts are essential instruments in the fight against terrorism.
*.. In our country, an indictment on terrorist offences comes
under the jurisdiction of the Assize Court, called the Audiencia
Nacional, a specialised body of jurisdiction, based in Madrid,
129. See John Ward Anderson & Pamela Rolfe, Spain Bitterly Divided as Terror Trial
Begins in '04 Train Bombings, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2007, at A12; Train Bomb Trial Starts
in Madrid, BBC NEWS, Feb. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6363149.stm.
130. Madrid Train Bombing Suspects to be Tried in Spain, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
Feb. 6, 2006, http://english.people.com.cn/200602/06/eng20060206_240448.html (stating, at
the time, that many of the people held were "nearing the end of the two-year period that
the law permits for preventative jail without charge").
131. Anderson & Rolfe, supra note 129.
132. Article 55(2) of the Spanish Constitution provides that certain rights, including the
length of preventive detention, privacy of one's residence, and secrecy of all forms of
communication, can be "suspended as regards specific persons in connection with investigations of the activities of armed bands or terrorist groups." CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art.
55(2) (Spain). Article 571 of the Criminal Code defines terrorists. CODIGO PENAL [C.P.]
art. 571 (Spain).
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whose jurisdiction covers all offences committed throughout the
whole of the national territory. It is an ordinary court, a civil tribunal made up of professional judges, members of the judiciary,
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission in compliance with
predetermined legal criteria, who are irremovable and answerable only to the law. The tribunal is independent from the executive and, hence, the government exerts no influence upon it whatsoever. In no circumstances are such prosecutions left to ordinary juries, given the risks involved.'
Cindido Conde-Pumpido Tour6n, justice of the Supreme Court of
Spain, clearly articulates the Spanish approach. Terrorists are criminals,
and the Spanish criminal justice system is the appropriate regime for
bringing terrorists to justice. In the context of addressing what paradigm
is most effective in the context of counterterrorism, the Spanish model is
a criminal law model with additional powers granted to the executive
branch at the expense of the suspect. Nevertheless, the suspect is to be
treated as a criminal suspect, with the full rights granted to all criminal
suspects, subject to certain limited exceptions.
CONCLUSION

The United States, post-9/11, clearly represents the extreme end of the
spectrum-terrorists are enemy combatants to be detained in Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, or so-called "black sites." The presidential
order established a judicial regime by which the terrorists are to be
brought to justice. Nevertheless, as discussed previously, the military
commissions have been significantly challenged in the courts and court of
public opinion alike. The "jury is still out"-at the time these lines are
written, no defendant has been brought to trial before the commission.
Unlike Israel, Russia, India, and Spain, which regularly try terrorists,
the Bush administration's initial handling of the fundamental issue that
this Article seeks to analyze has resulted in a clear policy failure. By
overreaching and establishing a judicial paradigm inconsistent both with
Article III requirements and international law guarantees, the administration opened the door to widespread criticism, which was not long in
coming. While the United States continues to hold hundreds of detainees
for trial, terrorist defendants held by the other nations surveyed in this
Article have been brought to trial in accordance with the traditional
criminal law paradigm or detained in accordance with an administrative
law process subject to independent judicial review.

133.

Tour6n, supra note 127.
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While Padilla v. Rumsfeld suggests "a crack in the wall," '13 the overall
approach of the United States has been steadfastly consistent both with
respect to which judicial paradigm to apply to terrorists and what measures can be subsequently implemented. The enemy combatant paradigm
as defined by the United States allows for basic violations of the Geneva
Convention that have not been adopted-and if adopted, then subsequently altered -by the other surveyed nations.
That is not to suggest that the operational counterterrorism measures
implemented by Russia and India are free of human rights violations.
They are not. However, in determining what judicial regime to apply to
terrorists, both countries ultimately have chosen to view terrorists as
criminals. That application does not apply to operational considerations.
Israel's approach with respect to what judicial regime to apply to terrorists has been to adopt a two-tier approach. While Russia, India, and
Spain have not adopted a similar regime, these three countries are more
closely aligned with Israel than with the United States. Israel, Spain, India, and Russia have consistently defined terrorism as a criminal act and
terrorists as criminals. The only exception with respect to how Spain
implements the criminal law paradigm is the implementation of incommunicado detention.
Implementation of methods extending beyond the criminal law paradigm suggests recognition that the traditional approach is ineffective.
Furthermore, careful analysis of how the paradigm has been implemented suggests overreaching and tweaking rather than a consistent legal
policy. In determining where to try terrorists the five surveyed nations
seemingly articulate a realization that terrorists are somehow different
than common criminals. Yet, how different and how to articulate the
difference is an issue with which jurists and decision makers alike are
struggling. That struggle results in policy inconsistency, ambiguity, and
violations of human rights.
How should we go forward? It is suggested that in the American setting, amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
whereby suspected terrorists would be brought to trial before the FISA
court, would resolve the policy and legal ambiguity of the past five years.
Such congressional initiative would enable the trying of suspected terrorists before a civilian court skilled and competent in issues inherently spe134. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Padillastated that the President
did not have the authority to designate someone within the United States as an enemy
combatant unless the President was given that authority by Congress. Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
352 F.3d 695, 712-15 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). In overturning the Second
Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that the proper respondent was the commander
of the naval brig where Padilla was being held, and thus the Southern District of New York
did not have jurisdiction. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 439-42, 451.
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cific to terrorist trials. As the Moussaoui trial clearly exhibited, traditional Article III courts are ill-equipped for such trials. It is recommended that trials of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism
would be heard before a bench trial, without a jury, to allow the introduction of intelligence information that would not be made available to the
defendant or counsel. While violative of the Sixth Amendment right to
confront the accuser, a court specifically trained in reading and analyzing
the reliability of intelligence information would satisfy a balancing test
whereby the State could introduce such information subject to strict judicial scrutiny by an independent court.
The separate judicial and operational approaches adopted by India and
Russia suggest the adoption and application of the criminal law paradigm
to a terrorist brought before a regular civilian court in conjunction with
aggressive operational counterterrorism in contrast to traditional law
enforcement. India and Russia treat terrorists as criminals once the terrorists are caught but not in an operational sense. Both countries have
come under severe criticism for widespread allegations of human rights
violations. Spain's approach is similar to that of Russia and India with
two significant differences. First, the Spanish government has implemented a policy of incommunicado detention while maintaining a traditional law enforcement rather than operational counter-terrorism approach. Second, unlike India and Russia, Spain treats terrorists as criminals in both the operational and judicial regimes. Nevertheless, the three
countries have largely resisted the adoption of a second judicial tier,
unlike the United States and Israel.
Israel has the most fully developed two-track judicial approach to terrorism in that defendants may be brought either to court for a full criminal trial or detained administratively subject to independent judicial review. A terrorist defendant brought to trial in a military court is provided full criminal rights and protections akin to the judicial process before a civilian court; in administrative detention, on the other hand, the
detainee is not entitled to confront his accuser.
In developing judicial policy with respect to where to try suspected terrorists, the five countries analyzed in this Article suggest different approaches to a similar dilemma. In determining how to most effectively
proceed, it is recommended that these nations establish a policy that most
effectively balances the rights of the individual with the rights of the
state. In the American context, it is recommended-as discussed
above-to amend the FISA court to enable the holding of criminal trials
before that court. In the Russian and Indian contexts, the holding of
criminal trials has been determined to be the preferred route though,
violations of human rights in the operational context remain a constant.
Similarly, Spain's incommunicado detention policy has been the subject
of criticism, but the Spanish model most consistently adapts the criminal
law paradigm from both a judicial policy and law enforcement perspec-
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tive. It remains to be seen whether Spain's model will become increasingly similar to Russia from an enforcement perspective or adopt an Israeli two-track approach.
Civil, democratic society must constantly engage in introspection with
respect to various measures adopted and implemented. This Article has
sought to shed light on the question of where suspected terrorists are to
be tried. It is suggested that the paradigms presently adopted may not be
the paradigms of tomorrow. The ultimate test is determining how the
five surveyed nations most effectively balance their national security with
providing terrorism defendants their day in court.

